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Public Authority Liability and the Regulation of
Nanotechnology: A European Perspective
Nina Natalia Baranowska*
Abstract
This paper argues that in certain circumstances public authorities should be
liable for regulating nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is an emerging field of
technology that enables to control shape and size of various structures, devices and
systems at nanometer scale on which one nanometer is equal to one-billionth of a
meter. In spite of being a nascent field of science and technology, its scope of
application – in the food, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, construction, textile,
electronics, and agricultural industries – is expanding rapidly. The risks
associated to nanotechnology, however, and its long-term consequences are still
largely unknown, particularly in regards to its health and safety impacts on
individuals. In this context of uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding this emerging
technology, it is highly problematic that the current legal liability framework in the
European Union for defective products under Product Liability Directive (85/374/
EEC), and the public authority liability for damage caused by EU institutions or by
its servants in the performance of their duties under Article 340 (2) TFEU – fails to
effectively protect users of nanotechnology.
Thus, it is imperative to ensure an adequate legal response in order to protect
users of nanotechnology. This piece proposes a regulatory framework that will
enable users to claim compensation from public authorities in cases of incomplete or
insufficient regulations in regards to nanotechnology. The proposed liability scheme
is based on (a) public authority liability as a secondary claim; (b) the infringement
of objective precautionary principles; (c) whereby the burden of proof rests on the
public authority; and (d) the limitation period for a claim for damages starts from
the time of knowledge about the cause of damage.
Finally, this paper concludes by recommending the implementation of
additional solutions to safeguard the protection of the users of nanoproducts.
These include creating an innovation fund for companies to share their profits with
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public authorities; governmental research subsidies and programmes financed from
public funds; and consumer awareness and education campaigns about risks related
to nanotechnology.

I. INTRODUCTION
In what circumstances, if any, should public authorities be held liable for
regulating the nanotechnology phenomenon? Such a question is not usually
taken into consideration in discussions about regulations concerning
nanotechnology1, i.e. technology that includes structures measuring in the 100
millionths of a millimetre. The area of application of nanotechnology is
extremely vast and includes such fields as the food industry, medicine,
construction, and textiles. The potential of the use of nanotechnology is still
growing and more and more products contain nanoparticles. Therefore,
nanotechnology is being discussed from various perspectives including ethics
and society, business, and global sustainability. 2 The legal aspects of
nanotechnology are analyzed mainly from the point of view of regulations and
recommendations of regulatory agencies in the areas of health and safety, the
environment, international trade and intellectual property law (patent and
copyright protection). 3 Within the scope of tort liability, the issue of
nanotechnology is raised mainly in the context of liability for defective products. 4
The possibility of placing a duty on public authorities to regulate
nanotechnology is a controversial issue. In general, the concept of public
authority liability includes the non-contractual liability of a public authority to
1

2

3

4

As explained below, discussion about regulating nanotechnology focuses mainly on the
areas of health and safety (see e.g. Aida Ponce Del Castillo, The EU approach to
regulating nanotechnology (Brussels: ETUI, 2010) at 33-34), environmental issues (see
e.g. Nanowerk, ‘‘Nanowaste - Nanomaterial-containing products at the end of their life
cycle,” online: <http://www.nanowerk.com/spotlight/spotid=38848.php> [‘‘Nanowaste”]), and intellectual property law (see e.g. Hsinchun Chen et al. ‘‘Trends in
nanotechnology patents” (2008) 3:3 Nature Nanotechnology 123; David S. Almeling,
‘‘Patenting Nanotechnology: Problems with the Utility Requirement” (2004) 1 Stan
Tech Law Rev 1; Indrani Barpujari, ‘‘The Patent Regime and Nanotechnology: Issues
and Challenges” (2010) 15 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 206). The liability
issue is analyzed (mainly) from the product liability perspective (see e.g. Geraint Howells,
‘‘Product Liability for Nanotechnology,” (2009) 32 Journal of Consumer Policy 381
[Howells, ‘‘Product Liability”]). The idea of regulating public authority liability for
improper regulation of nanotechnology is missing in those discussions.
See generally Donald Maclurcan & Natalia Radywyl, Nanotechnology and Global
Sustainability (New York: CRC Press, 2011); Jo Anne Shatkin, Nanotechnology: Health
and Environmental Risks, (New York: CRC Press, 2012); Michael T. Burke, Nanotechnology: The Business, (New York: CRC Press, 2008); Deb Bennett-Woods, Nanotechnology: Ethics and Society (New York: CRC Press, 2008).
See e.g. Prabuddha Ganguli & Siddharth Jabade, Nanotechnology Intellectual Property
Rights: Research, Design, and Commercialization (New York: CRC Press, 2012).
See Howells, ‘‘Product Liability”, supra note 1 at 381; Patrick M. Boucher,
Nanotechnology: Legal Aspects (New York: CRC Press, 2008).
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make good any damage arising from its acts or omissions. The concept has
evolved since the 19th century, when legal systems were initially based on the idea
of full state immunity, expressed in a maxim ‘‘The King can do no wrong”. 5 The
‘‘public authority” usually refers to central and local government (e.g. federal
and provincial government), the legislative body (e.g. parliament), ‘‘the State”
itself (if the State has a legal personality), as well as judges and judicial
representatives. Therefore, the possibility of holding public authorities liable
depends on the shape of a political and legal system in a given country, and
attention must be paid to the specific bodies responsible for making policy and
legally binding decisions. Further parts of this paper use the notion ‘‘public
authorities”, with the reservation that it may concern the government or
legislature in the context of a specific case or legal order.
This paper is concerned with European Union (EU) law, including the
liability of the European Union as a policy-maker and maker of product liability
law. However, the concepts presented here have a universal nature and concern
general policy recommendations which can be applied in various legal systems.
EU law is an interesting example of exercising public power. The EU is a political
and economic union consisting of 28 Member States which has created an
internal single market and, to certain extent, a standardized system of law. 6
Looking back at the origin of the EU, and earlier at the creation of the European
Communities, it should be noted that the deepened cooperation between states
was, and still is, based on the growth of the internal market and economic trade,
including the abolition of barriers to starting and conducting business activity. 7
It would have been impossible, however, to put the idea of creating a common
market into practice without conducting legislative activities at the level of the
Union and the states, and creating a complete and coherent system of judicial
protection.8 The Member States passed some of their law-making competencies
to EU institutions, but at the same time they maintain their own internal legal
systems.9 Therefore, in the EU, there are two levels at which public power is
5

6

7

8

9

See George W. Pugh, ‘‘Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity,”
(1953) 13:3 La L Rev 476 at 479; Herbert Barry, ‘‘The King Can Do No Wrong,” (1925)
11 Va L Rev 349 at 352.
See also K.P.E. Lasok & D. Lasok, Law and Institutions of the European Union (London:
Butterworths, 2001) at 3-21; Jean-Claude Piris, The Constitution for Europe: A Legal
Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 38-40; Nigel Foster, Foster
on EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 3-45.
See Art. 3 ust. 3 Treaty on European Union (Consolidated versions of the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2012/C
326/01, 26/10/2012) [TFEU].
See Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis & Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015) at 1-3.
See Francis G. Jacobs, ‘‘The Evolution of the European legal Order”, in Alison
McDonnell, ed., A Review of Forty Years of Community Law: Legal Developments in the
European Communities and the European Union (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
2005) at 21-34.
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exercised: national and EU.10 Both systems are combined within a web of legal
enactments and legislative processes. The approximation of the systems of law in
the EU Member States is done through the harmonization and unification
processes. Harmonization includes all actions taken by the member states in
order to adjust national systems of law. It involves primarily the introduction of
similar legal solutions (especially in respect of minimum standards) or, in general,
the introduction of ‘‘consistency”, in its broad meaning, into the systems of law.
This consistency is derived from various traditions (Romano-Germanic,
Scandinavian, and common law), 11 which demonstrate different legal
mentalities and different approaches to law. The basic tool in the
harmonization of laws in the EU is the Directive. 12 Unification, on the other
hand, includes legislative activities undertaken by the Union legislator as well as
the uniform application of legal norms by courts of law. Unification is mainly
achieved by Regulations.13 Legislative actions of the EU, which acts as a public
authority through Directives and Regulations, have a significant impact on
determining common standards of protection for individuals. The problem of
policy strategy in the case of nanotechnology is of key importance for EU
legislators from the perspective of protecting individuals. Regardless of any
specific public authority liability, the arguments used later in this paper show
that, in certain circumstances, public authorities should be held responsible for
acts or omissions in their regulation of nanotechnology. This paper will consider
three aspects of liability. The first aspect is liability for the improper regulation of
nanotechnology, for example, when nanoproducts harm a consumer. A
‘‘consumer” is a final user of a product containing nanoparticles, such as a
user of clothes or paints produced with the use of nanomaterials. 14 The gist of
this liability would be, in one sense, a continuation of the liability for defective
products (product liability). However, the difference is that the cause of the
defectiveness of a product will be the lack of proper regulation, which would
otherwise have ensured the user’s safety.
The second aspect is liability for the improper regulation of nanotechnology
in situations when nanomaterials can cause damage to the ‘‘operators”, such as
10

11

12

13

14

See in-depth discussion on EU law and state sovereignty in Rene Barents, The Autonomy
of Community Law, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004) at 23-106.
See Jan Rajski, ‘‘On the Need for the Progressive Harmonisation of Private Law in the
European Union: The Role of Legal Science and Education” (2006) XI Juridica
International 20.
Directives bind the member states in respect of the result, allowing them, as a rule, to
freely choose the form and method to achieve that result (see TFEU, supra note 7, art. 288
para. 3). Due to the very extent of this freedom the directive is considered to be the most
appropriate instrument for the approximation of laws.
Regulations have general application, they bind in their entirety and they are directly
applicable in all Member States (see TFEU, supra note 7, art. 288(2)).
Compare Rafal Manko, ‘‘The Notion of ’Consumer’ in EU Law,” (6 May 2013) Library
Briefing: Library of the European Parliament.
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the operators of nanomaterials during a production process or during their
application (e.g. while using nano-devices). Some nanomaterials, like nanosilver,
have toxic properties, so that operators are exposed to danger in relation to the
application of nanomaterials.
The third aspect is slightly different and concerns liability for the improper
regulation of nanotechnology where regulations cause harm to companies using
nanomaterials. The introduction of unjustified restrictions on the application of
nanotechnology may cause financial losses for the enterprises applying this
technology. What is more, overregulating nanotechnology may curb
technological development.
Improper regulation in given aspects could be both the lack of regulations
(legislative omission), or imperfect regulation, i.e. regulation not resulting in
proper protection or regulation that is too strict.
The main problem related to nanotechnology, and expressed in the paper, is
to provide appropriate safety levels for nanotechnology’s users (consumers and
operators), while also providing a favourable environment for technological
development, which to some extent is also desirable from a societal perspective.
The starting point of the paper is to present nanotechnology as an emerging
technology, and show how its characteristic features such as size, unpredictability
and the fact that it is still under development (Part II) lead to a key problem:
increased risks (Part III). The current state of research on nanotechnology does
not allow a determination of the long-term consequences of using nanoproducts
(including the impact of nanoparticles on the human body and the environment,
as well as the properties of materials reduced to nanoscale, etc.). Part IV explains
the reasons why the market, social norms and ‘‘architecture” may not fully
regulate for safety measures related to the use of nanotechnology, and why hard
law regulations are necessary. As a result, legislation could play a central role in
regulating nanotechnology. Part V concerns problems related to product liability
regulation. According to an Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) report from 2013, the existing legal framework is able to
cover nanoproducts.15 However, the report takes into account mostly regulatory
aspects (mainly the food industry perspective), not liability issues. The product
liability law that is now in force in the European Union (under Product Liability
Directive 85/374/EEC 16 ) does not effectively protect the users of
nanotechnology, which means that in the case of damage caused by a
nanoproduct, the users are deprived of adequate protective measures.
15

16

See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Working Party on
Nanotechnology). ‘‘Regulatory Frameworks for Nanotechnology in Foods and Medical
Products. Summary results of a survey activity” (OECD, 21 March 2013), online:
<http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/regulatory-frameworks-fornanotechnology-in-foods-and-medical-products_5k47w4vsb4s4-en> [OECD 2013 Report].
Council Directive, (85/374/EEC) (25 July 1985), On the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for
defective products [1985] OJ, L 210 at 29 [Product Liability Directive].
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A proposed solution for these problems is to draft regulations which enable
injured parties to claim compensation from public authorities in situations when
policy-makers have not imposed the necessary regulations, or have enacted
incomplete or insufficient regulations. This would establish regulation around
public authority liability (Part VI). The scope of the EU’s non-contractual
liability, as a legal entity responsible for policy-making, for damage arising from
the incomplete or lack of sufficient regulations does not currently cover
nanotechnology.
This paper bases the proposed regulations on certain assumptions, including:
a) the regulation will provide the aggrieved parties with compensatory damages
when the injury was caused in connection with the use of nanotechnology; b)
regulating public authority liability will create incentives for policy-makers so
that they will take more effective and more precautionary actions; c) by
regulating public authority liability tort law could regain its primary function
which is the materialization of the idea of justice; d) although any additional
regulations can result in stifling the pace of technological development,
regulating public authority liability can slow down this pace potentially to a
lesser degree than regulating the liability of companies because public authority
liability does not affect the functioning of tech companies directly and thus it
interferes less in the pace of technological development; and e) the public and
businesses expect that the policy-makers will take regulatory steps.
Part VII will explain the elements of this type of liability. First, public
authority liability should be a secondary claim. This regulation should be based
on an objective infringement of law, informed by precautionary principles, and
not a standard of subjective fault. The burden of proof should rest on the public
authority, which means that the public authority will have to prove that it has
not infringed precautionary principles. Because of the long-term consequences of
nanotechnology, the limitation period should start from the time of knowledge
about the cause of damage.
Apart from hard law regulation, there is a need to propose some mechanisms
that will fulfill the presented concept. First, companies should share their profits
with the government by contributing to a special ‘‘innovation fund”. Public
authorities could contribute to the research process not only by paying
compensation but also by ordering additional research, subsidizing research
centers, and providing various programmes financed from public funds. The last
point is that the users of nanoproducts should be informed about nanomaterials
used in products and about the risks related to nanotechnology.

II. NANOTECHNOLOGY — EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
Nanotechnology is the ‘‘design, characterization, production and application
of structures, devices and systems by controlling shape and size at nanometre
scale.”17 One nanometre (nm) is equal to one-billionth of a metre (0.000000001
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m). To put it vividly, a red blood cell is approximately 7000nm wide, while
hemoglobin, the molecule in red blood cells, which carries oxygen, is
approximately 5 nanometers.18 The concept of nanoscience and the possibility
of manipulating materials at the size of atoms and molecules was described for
the first time by Richard P. Feynman during the plenary session of American
Physical Society in 1959. The term ‘‘nanotechnology” was used for the first time
by Japanese professor Norio Taniguchi of the University of Science in Tokyo in
1974. In 1980 Eric Drexler, an American engineer, developed and popularized
the potential of molecular nanotechnology in his book Engines of Creation: The
Coming Era of Nanotechnology.19
Nanotechnology is a fast growing area with considerable potential.
According to some authors, nanotechnology is ‘‘science’s next big thing”,20 or
even ‘‘the next industrial revolution”.21 The broad scope of the application of
nanotechnology means that users are sometimes not aware of nanoparticles’
existence in various products or of the use of nanotechnology in everyday life.
Nanotechnology is also an interdisciplinary field and involves expertise
knowledge from different disciplines such as physics, chemistry, engineering,
information technology, and biology.22
The existence of nanoparticles in everyday products is not a new event.
Nanomaterials have been used in the past, for example, in car tires. 23 However,
the scope for the application of nanotechnology is broadening. Nanotechnology
is now used in the food industry, the pharmaceutical industry, medicine (e.g.
contrast agents used in diagnosis and biomedicine), cosmetics and sunscreens,
construction (e.g. insulation materials, self-cleaning and automotive paints), the
textile industry and sporting goods (e.g. smart clothes), the agricultural industry
17

18

19

20

21

22

23

See Royal Society & Royal Academy of Engineering, Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies:
Opportunities and Uncertainties (London: The Royal Society, 2004) at 5, online:
<https://royalsociety.org/~/media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/
2004/9693.pdf>.
‘‘Cancer & Nanotech”, National Cancer Institutehttps://nano.cancer.gov/learn/understanding/, online: <https://www.cancer.gov/sites/nano/cancer-nanotechnology/benefits> [NCI, ‘‘Cancer & Nanotech”].
See Nikolay K. Tolochko, ‘‘History of Nanotechnology,” Encyclopedia of Life Support
Systems (EOLSS), online: <https://www.eolss.net/><http://www.eolss.net/samplechapters/c05/E6-152-01.pdf>.
See Jane Macoubrie, ‘‘Informed Public Perceptions of Nanotechnology and Trust in
Government” (2005) Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at 1, online:
<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/macoubriereport1.pdf> [Macoubrie,
‘‘Informed Public”].

See e.g. Christine Peterson, ‘‘Molecular Nanotechnology: the Next Industrial Revolution,” online: <https://www.foresight.org/nano/IEEEComputer.html>.
See Alan L. Porter & Jan Youtie, ‘‘How interdisciplinary is nanotechnology?”, online:
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2988207/>.
See ‘‘Nanoparticles vs. Rubber - Could Nanomaterials Replace Rubber?” (15 August
2005) AZoNano, online: <http://www.azonano.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=1351>.
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(e.g. pesticides), electronics, optics, aerospace, and the defense industry, etc. 24 It
is difficult to estimate how many consumer products with nanoparticles are
already on the market. Different authors indicate that the number of
nanoproducts that have already been introduced to the market could vary
from 500 to more than 1600.25 The future and potential of nanotechnology are
difficult to predict. Researchers are still working on nanodevices that could be
used in cancer diagnosis.26 In future, nanoparticles will probably be able to come
together on their own and be self-replicating, so that they can function like living
creatures.27 It seems that all discussions about nanotechnology and its attendant
problems are just beginning.

III. NANOTECHNOLOGY — MACRO-PROBLEMS
Although the use of nanotechnology is growing rapidly, with more and more
products including nanoparticles, this technology poses certain threats and risks.
One may claim that every new technology carries some risk, but as presented in
this paper, the risks entailed by nanotechnology and its potential negative
impacts are significant.
The first and most obvious observation is that nanomaterials have reached a
size that requires highly-advanced research apparatuses such as nanomicroscopes to apply nanomaterials in products and to control them.
Therefore, not every laboratory or scientific centre will possess the essential
equipment to carry on research on nanomaterials. It leads to dangerous
consequences for the users of nanoproducts with regards to evidential proof
problems. For example, in the case of injuries caused by a nanoproduct, the user
will have a limited ability to prove that a particular nanomaterial used in the
product caused their injury. This challenge is not restricted to nanotechnology. It
is a previously known phenomena apparent from the use of other highly
advanced technologies. However, in the case of nanotechnology it occurs with
increased frequency, especially because the level of knowledge and the access to
24

25
26
27

Compare Katharine Sanderson, ‘‘What You Need to Know About Nano-food,” The
Guardian (26 April 2013), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/what-is-nano/whatyou-need-know-about-nano-food>; Sangeeta Bhatia, ‘‘This Tiny Particle Could Roam
Your Body to Find Tumors,” Ted Talk, online: <http://www.ted.com/talks/sangeeta_bhatia_this_tiny_particle_could_roam_your_body_to_find_tumors> [Bhatia,
‘‘Roam Your Body”]; Anne Trafton, ‘‘Nanobionic Spinach Plants Can Detect
Explosives,” MIT News (31 October 2016), online: <http://news.mit.edu/2016/nanobionic-spinach-plants-detect-explosives-1031>.
See e.g. Nanotech Project, online: <http://www.nanotechproject.org/cpi/>.
See Bhatia, ‘‘Roam Your Body”, supra note 24.
See Art Molella, ‘‘In the World of Nanotechnology, Anything Is Possible,” The Atlantic
(31 May 2011), online: <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/05/inthe-world-of-nanotechnology-anything-is-possible/239678/>; George Tulevski, ‘‘The
Next Step in Nanotechnology,” Ted Talk, online: <http://www.ted.com/talks/george_tulevski_the_next_step_in_nanotechnology>.
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highly advanced equipment which can examine nanoparticles are limited. The
other difficulties refer to uncertainty concerning causality. Even if the injured
party has access to the advanced equipment and thus the possibility of examining
the effects of nanoparticles, in some cases it will still be impossible to prove what
exactly caused the damage (the nanoparticle itself, the reaction with other
particles, the technique by which it has been applied in the product, the way of
using the product, etc.). This uncertainty is the result of basing production
processes on technologies with effects that are not fully understood, and which
may be uncontrolled.
The second argument, which is closely related to the previous one, is that this
technology is still under development. Researchers and experts are working on
new practical applications for some nanomaterials as well as new measurement
methods. It is already scientifically proven that some materials change their
features when they are minimized to nanoscale.28 For example, some of them
change their colors, while others can be extremely hazardous, even though the
same material when ‘‘regular” size is not. For example, nanosilver is highly
toxic.29
Third, the long-term safety of nanomaterials is unverified and the risks
related to their application are difficult to estimate. It also means that the
consequences of nanomaterials for human health are mostly unknown. One of
the potential uses of nanotechnology in medicine is that of enabling nanodevices
such as nanotubes or nanoshells to circulate in the bloodstream. Because of their
size, smaller than a human cell, nanodevices could get access to areas of the body
which are now inaccessible. Owing to this ability, nanodevices could diagnose
diseases and deliver treatments in a more precise and accurate way.30 However, it
is still unknown how the nanodevices would interact with human cells: how the
organism would manage to eliminate them, and what the long-term
consequences of circulating nanodevices in blood vessels could be. The second
example regarding long-term safety refers to the level of protection after the
period of the use of nanomaterials has ended. There is not enough research on
how nanowaste will respond to thermal or biological treatment. 31

IV. DECIDING WHEN AND HOW TO REGULATE
NANOTECHNOLOGY
When facing challenges caused by technological innovations,32 policymakers have in practice two possible scenarios to enact. In the first scenario, they
28

29
30
31
32

See Steffen F. Hansen & Anders Baun, ‘‘When Enough is Enough,” (1 July 2012) 7
Nature Nanotechnology 409—411, online: <http://www.nature.com/nnano/journal/
v7/n7/full/nnano.2012.115.html> [Hansen & Baun, ‘‘Enough is Enough”].
Hansen & Baun, ibid.
NCI, ‘‘Cancer & Nanotech”, supra note 18.
‘‘Nanowaste”, supra note 1.
For example Brownsword describes new technologies as the challenge of regulatory
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can introduce some regulations on the emerging technology. The regulations will
usually impose limits on the application of the technology, set out requirements
for introducing the technology to market, the conditions under which the
technology can be used (e.g. safety standards) or, in the most extreme way, they
can forbid the use of the technology. In the second scenario, policy-makers can
simply wait and observe how the new technology is going to develop. Even
though policy-makers do not take any steps to establish new regulations for the
technology, the technology will usually be regulated, to some extent, by existing
legal rules. In this case the concept of ‘‘translation”, developed by Lawrence
Lessig, is of key importance.33 According to Lessig’s concept, in the face of
changing technological realities, ‘‘translation” protects the meaning and restores
the original values of existing legal regulations. In some cases changing an
interpretative practice and, for example, increasing the scope of the application
of existing rules will be sufficient to deal with new technologies.34
Moreover, the lack of legal actions from public authorities does not mean
that the use of the technology is not regulated. According to Lessig, there are
four modalities that could regulate it: legal norms, social norms, markets and
‘‘architecture”.35 If legal regulations do not provide an adequate legal response
for the new reality created by the emerging technology, other modalities will take
the primary role. Lessig claims that social norms regulate the reality and are
enforced by a community. Markets regulate people’s behavior by price. The last
modifier that could operate in the absence of legal regulations is ‘‘architecture”.
The ‘‘architecture” of the physical world has an impact on how technology is
used. For example, it can make the application of the technology more common,
encourage people to use it and build trust in it.36
How can these modalities be relevant to the case of nanotechnology? First of
all, the market could regulate the use of nanoproducts by their price. This would
mean that if nanoproducts are cheaper than products which do not contain
nanoparticles, people are encouraged to buy more nanoproducts. On the other
hand, if the price of nanoproducts declines too far, consumers might start
thinking of nanoproducts as being cheaper, less reliable and poorer quality
replacements of regular products.

33

34
35

36

connection, see R. Brownsword Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008). Marchant, Allenby, and Herkert describe new
technologies as the ‘pacing problem’, see G. Marchant, B. Allenby & J. Herkert, The
Growing Gap between Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight: The Pacing
Problem (Springer Netherlands, 2011).
See Lawrence Lessig, Code v.2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006) at 163-165 [Lessig,
Code].
Lessig, ibid.
See Lawerence Lessig, ‘‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw might Teach” (19992000) 113 Harv L Rev 501 at 507 [Lessig, ‘‘Law of the Horse”].
Lessig, ibid at 509.
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The crucial element of regulating nanotechnology by social norms refers to
the level of consumers’ knowledge of this technology. A society which is wellinformed about nanoproducts can make a conscious decision and generate
norms about whether, and how, it wants to use nanoproducts.
The most challenging task is to apply ‘‘architecture” to nanotechnology. It
should be noted that Lessig’s concept of modalities refers primarily to new
technologies with relation to cyberspace. Taking into account the nature of
nanotechnology, which is a highly advanced and scientific field, and that
nanoparticles are imperceptible by the regular user, the ‘‘architecture” modality
will probably have a limited application to this technology. However, it can
apply to the physical design of nanoproducts, especially their packaging. The
package informing the user that nanomaterials are used in a production process
can encourage or discourage people to buy the nanoproduct, depending on a
current consumer fad. Furthermore, the amount of safety information a label
contains can result in gaining or losing consumers’ trust in a product.
All the modalities expressed by Lessig could have some impact on the
manner that nanotechnology is regulated. However, their importance decreases
when we take into account the need to establish a proper level of safety for
nanoproducts, and the possibility for redress when damages are caused by
nanoproducts. Neither social norms, the market, nor ‘‘architecture” can fully or
effectively regulate for product safety and ensure sufficient protection from the
risks nanotechnology involves and thus they will play minor roles. Precise safety
requirements are an emerging issue related to nanotechnology.
The pace of technological development and its influence on legal regulations
has induced wide-ranging and in-depth discussions among legal scholars.37 Lyria
Bennett Moses makes an interesting point that instead of trying to answer how
new technologies should be regulated, one should answer how the adjustment of
the legal response to socio-technical change might be institutionally managed. 38
Bennett Moses indicates that policy-makers have to find an adequate response,
not because technology itself is a problem, but because innovations create a new
socio-technical landscape with many new negative characteristics such as harm,
risks, market failures, and inequality.39 Tony Prosser identifies four rationales
for regulating technologies. These are: 1) economic efficiency and market choice,
(2) regulation to protect rights, (3) regulation for social solidarity, and (4)
regulation as deliberation.40 Bennett Moses explains that regulation processes
37
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See e.g. Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, & Karen Yeung, eds., The Oxford
Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017);
Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung, eds., Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures,
Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes (Hart Publishing, 2008).
See Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘‘Regulating in the Face of Sociotechnical Change” in Roger
Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, & Karen Yeung, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Law,
Regulation and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) at 1, 3, 8, 11, 19
[Moses, ‘‘Sociotechnical Change”].
Moses, ‘‘Sociotechnical Change”, ibid, at 5.
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have to take into account reframing regulatory design, regulatory institutions,
regulatory timing, and regulatory responsiveness,41 while Julia Black has stressed
the role of political considerations.42 Roger Brownsword, on the other hand,
points out that technological development can have both positive and negative
impacts on the liberty of individuals.43 The use of some technologies might result
in the loss of liberty44 or contribute to the creation of a surveillance system.45
Instead of paying attention to the normative backgrounds of technological use,
Brownsword highlights the role of ‘‘technological management”, which might
practically prevent users of a technology from taking certain actions.46
Nanotechnology is a technology in which legal regulation could play a
central role. The benefits of regulating nanotechnology could include, among
other things, the protection of its users47 and building public trust. Research
done by the Woodrow Wilson International Center in 2005, titled ‘‘Informed
Public Perceptions of Nanotechnology and Trust in Government”, shows that
there is high demand for effective government regulation of nanotechnology.48
The study was carried out with groups of citizens in Cleveland, Dallas, and
Spokane, in the USA. A majority of the participants felt that government control
beyond voluntary standards is necessary with respect to nanotechnology (55%).
Among the preferred ways of government actions that will increase public trust,
participants indicated: safety tests before market (34.5%), supplying more
product information so people can choose (24.9%), showing how regulatory
practices are sufficient (11.9%), and better tracking the product risks in market
(9.6%).49
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Scotford, & Karen Yeung, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and
Technology, (Oxford: University Press, 2017), at 1-2 [Brownsword, ‘‘Law, Liberty, and
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See also Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet (Penguin, 2009); Siva
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(University of California Press, 2011).
See also David Lyon, Surveillance Society (Open University Press, 2001); Zygmunt
Bauman & David Lyon, Liquid Surveillance (Polity Press, 2013).
See Brownsword ‘‘Law, Liberty, and Technology”, supra note 43 at 3.
See Marion Nestle, ‘‘Is Nanotechnology the New GMO?” The Atlantic (16 December
2011), online: <https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/12/is-nanotechnology-the-new-gmo/249982/>.
See Macoubrie, ‘‘Informed Public”, supra note 20.
See Macoubrie, ibid, at 16-20.
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On the other hand, policy-makers’ actions to regulate a technology can stifle
the pace of technological development and even result in blocking further
development. For example, the way genetically modified organism (GMO)
technology has been regulated in the EU (e.g. mandatory labelling) outpaced
attention to the environmental, health, and safety implications, 50 while other
products, such as hormones, remain less tested and monitored. The role of the
policy-maker is thus to balance the necessity of ensuring an adequate level of
protection while using nanotechnology (if the benefits outweigh the risks) to
provide more advanced research and to foster innovation. The lack of knowledge
about the long-term health effects of using nano-products causes difficulties in
establishing one precise standard that can be applied to public authorities that
are seeking to craft regulations that attempt to balance both health and safety
considerations with the creation of conditions in which innovation in the
nanotechnology area can thrive. Generally, it can be claimed that the standard
should correspond to the safety level that the users are entitled to expect, based
on the current state of knowledge, but also including justified predictions. Those
expectations should be assessed from the normal and prudent user’s
perspective.51 Even though nanotechnology is usually operated by a specific
group of users (e.g. scientists, researchers), the assessment of the safety of a nanoproduct should be made solely based on what a final, normal user could expect.
The complexity of nanotechnology and the vast scope of its application justify
taking into account the safety expectations of the final user. It means that the
standard applied by public authorities should remain flexible and correspond to
actual problems.
Too strict or too expanded a regulatory legal system can also lead to
overregulation.52 Both the users of the technology and the companies working on
the technology can be overwhelmed by the number of regulations. Moreover,
when the regulations are very precise and detailed, they start losing their
flexibility, and after some time, their importance. For example, if the policymaker draws up a list of potential dangerous materials and provides the exact
name or chemical composition, it can quickly turn out that a substance with a
similar, but not exactly the same, chemical composition will be excluded from the
application of this regulation, even though it has dangerous features. One
solution to prevent such a situation is to create principle-based regulations,
which would be more flexible and accurate.53 Principal-based regulation is one of
50
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the regulatory approaches which is based on the general and broad principles
established by the public authority, instead of precise and detailed rules. 54 Owing
to that, regulated entities (e.g. companies) have more freedom in choosing the
methods of complying with these principles. At the same time, broad principles
are less likely to be outpaced by the passage of time and fast-changing
technological realities.55
Regulation might also be a costly process. More regulations on technology,
such as restrictions on a production process, higher safety standards and
mandatory requirements like additional, more detailed safety tests, product
labelling, risk tracking, mandatory maintenance and reviews of a product, can all
impose extra costs on a company. These extra costs generated by additional
regulations are usually passed on to the consumers of the final product. 56 When
users receive a product which meets higher standards of protection, the price of a
product will usually be higher. This means that the costs of raising a product’s
standards will be covered by the users of the technology, which at the end of the
day can result in ‘‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater.” Ensuring high
quality and safety standards can lead to an increase in price to a level where
buying a product is no longer cost-effective and lucrative. Users can thus make a
decision not to purchase a product, but then they will be deprived of the real
possibility of taking advantages of technological development. Therefore, setting
disproportionate standards of protection can adversely affect users’ decisions.
Moreover, if users do not buy products, companies will not have enough revenue
to invest in further innovations. Nonetheless, it can be observed that currently,
more and more policy-makers and legal scholars recognize the problems
associated with nanotechnology. Their works are devoted, for the most part,
to public law regulations (administrative admission, registration of
nanomaterials, etc.).57 A report, ‘‘Regulatory Frameworks for Nanotechnology
in Foods and Medical Products”, by the OECD Working Party on
Nanotechnology (WPN), published in 2013, suggests that the existing legal
53
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framework is able to cover nanoproducts.58 The European Commission also
concluded that ‘‘foods and medical products that may contain nanomaterials, or
otherwise involve the application of nanotechnology, are covered under existing
national and/or regional legislative and regulatory frameworks that are relevant
and applicable to food and medical products”.59 The commentators are less
optimistic. Clarence J. Davis argues that the existing regulatory and management
scheme will probably not be able to deal with nanotechnology. Among the
obstacles he points out are: lack of sufficient data, inability to monitor and
control the development of nanotechnology by regulatory authorities, and
insufficient funding of research and enforcement mechanisms.60 There are also
contradictory opinions about whether or not nanotechnology should be
regulated. Sonia Arrison claims that nanotechnology could flourish only
through ‘‘modest regulation, civilian research, and an emphasis on selfregulation and responsible professional culture”.61 The argument for selfregulation is that companies and private research centers can assess the actual
risk in a better way than government.62 Certain groups such as the Natural
Resources Defense Council and Greenpeace call for slowing down
nanotechnology research and development.63 A more balanced opinion has
been expressed by Linda Breggin and Leslie Carothers. The authors propose a
multi-pronged and integrated approach to the nanotechnology phenomenon.
This approach could include ‘‘elements of regulatory and voluntary programs
58
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under existing environmental statutes; corporate stewardship; tort liability;
federal, state, and local legislation; voluntary standards; disclosure; liability
insurance; and international measures”.64

V. PROBLEMS WITH EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
So far, little attention has been devoted to the issue of liability with respect to
nanotechnology.65 Although nanotechnology generates new risks, there is no
separate liability regime, which means that the traditional rules of existing tort
law have to be applied in the case of injuries caused by nanomaterials. From the
user’s perspective, liability rules might be as important as health and safety
regulations. This is because the safety rules are addressed mainly to the
companies, and consumers are not directly identified by such regulations. The
regulation of compensation for damages caused by products which do not meet
certain safety requirements might be thus more interesting for the users of
nanoproducts. This area is regulated by tort law, more precisely by product
liability law, and its role in connection with the development of new technologies
should primarily be users’ protection.
Unfortunately, existing regulations in force in the EU Member States
regarding liability for damage caused by defective products, implemented under
the Product Liability Directive,66 is not a fully adequate legal response to the risks
connected with nanoproducts and fails to ensure appropriate levels of safety for
users of this technology.67
First of all, the Directive limits the scope of its application to ‘‘tangible”
goods. According to Article 2 of the Directive, ‘‘product” means all movables,
with the exception of primary agricultural products and game, even when
incorporated into another movable or into an immovable.68 The definition of a
‘‘product” causes some problems with respect to nanotechnology. Nanomaterials
can be classified as tangible, but invisible, objects which are the components of
the product. However, nanotechnology can also be used to produce products, for
example by nanolaser;69 as well as possibly being a part of a service, for example
medical procedures or treatment,70 which are not covered by the scope of the
application of the Directive.
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Secondly, legal problems are related to a notion of ‘‘defectiveness”. Under
Article 6 of the Directive, a product is defective when it does not provide the
safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account,
including (a) the presentation of the product, (b) the use to which it could
reasonably be expected that the product would be put, and (c) the time when the
product was put into circulation. Also, a product shall not be considered
defective for the sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into
circulation. The phrase, ‘‘the safety which a person is entitled to expect”, shows
that the Directive regime is based on a consumer expectation model.71 The crucial
element of this model, however, is the necessity that consumers are well-informed
so that they can make an informed decision as to whether or not they would like
to use nanoproducts. Currently, there is no legal obligation to inform consumers
about the risks associated with the use of nanoproducts, e.g. by labelling.
Labelling issues remain controversial. Marchant, Douglas and Abbott
introduced labelling as a discriminatory action, from the point of view of
market mechanisms, because of its stigmatization effect.72 Similarly, Juni has
pointed out the difficulties of companies in relation to the communication of the
risks.73 Introducing new technologies can cause fear and social concerns, and run
into resistance against their use. In many cases this anxiety is unsupported and
based solely on the fear of novelty. It often results from false, selective, or
misinterpreted information about a new technology, as well as conflicting reports
from the science world, ‘‘media storm”, and groups of opponents. An example of
distrust in technological development might be the example of the ‘‘anti-vax”
movement emerging in Europe and North America.74 This movement originates
from an article of Dr. Andrew Wakefield published in the The Lancet in 1998.
According to Wakefield’s research, 8 of 12 children brought by their parents to a
hospital in London exhibited symptoms of autism within 14 days after MMR
vaccination (measles, mumps and rubella). The research was criticized by other
experts and finally it turned out that in an examined group there was only one
case of autism symptoms, which appeared a few months after the vaccination.
Dr. Wakefield was removed from the register of professional medical
practitioners and 12 years after it was published, his article was withdrawn
from the journal.75 Despite these facts, the ‘‘anti-vax” movement is growing and
members of this group stigmatize vaccination technology.
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The stigmatization effect can also be seen in case of GMOs. Although new
technologies are usually introduced to the market under the assumption that they
will be beneficial and bring improvement to existing technologies, they are
sometimes rejected by the potential users for above mentioned reasons. In that
case, labelling can magnify the effect of distrust and resistance, which can be seen
in the social approach to GMO in the EU. The EU selectively targets products
which are made through GM processes, although there is no evidence that proves
that these processes are riskier than other methods of processing food.76 Under
EU Regulation No. 1830/2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of
genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed products
produced from genetically modified organisms, 77 GMO products are subject to
strict labelling and traceability, even though researchers are in agreement that
GMO food products are not more hazardous than the non-GMO food, and are
actually even safer.78 Consumers are more aware of the existence of GMO food,
but on the other hand they are not informed about hormones for example, which
are less monitored, and at the end of the day consumers could make a biased
decision.
Nonetheless, to some extent, labelling can be beneficial. First, since users do
not know that the product contains nanomaterials, they have a limited ability to
benefit, for example, from the protection provided by tort law. Accurate
information enables users to make an informed decision about whether they
want to use potentially dangerous technology and expose themselves to the
possibility of harm.79
Apart from labelling, users could also be informed about risks by the media
or public campaigns. According to Howells, if risks are known and users are
informed, the matter of defectiveness depends on whether the risks are socially
acceptable.80 Greater risk will probably be more acceptable in the area of
medicine and pharmaceuticals, where the risk could bring considerable
improvement, rather than in the cosmetics or entertainment industry.81 The
moment of assessing the defectiveness of a product is when the product is put
into circulation on the market, under Article 6(1)(c) of the Product Liability
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Directive. Under Article 6(2) a product shall not be considered defective for the
sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into circulation.82
The notion of defectiveness is tied to the admissibility of the development
risk defence. According to Article 7(e) of the Directive, the producer shall not be
liable if he proves that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time
when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence
of the defect to be discovered.83 This defence is especially favourable to those
producers who use new technological processes, the consequences of which are
difficult to predict. The existing legal framework demands that companies make
a reasonable decision based on data and research available only when the
product is put into circulation. As indicated above, the most significant problem
with nanoproducts is that currently, the risks and negative effects on the human
body and the environment are mostly unknown. The growing pace of
technological development in the area of nanotechnology could result in
producers being able to easily free themselves from responsibility. The existing
regulations also create an incentive to put products on the market carelessly and
to do less research ahead of time.84
The next problem relates to the limitation period. Under Article 10(2) of the
Directive, the rights conferred upon the injured person to claim for compensation
shall be extinguished upon the expiry of a period of 10 years from the date on
which the producer put into circulation the product which caused the damage.
Taking into account that the detrimental effects of nanotechnology applications
might not present themselves for a long period of time, a 10-year limitation
period from the date on which the producer put the product into circulation
seems to be insufficient.
More general problems with the existing legal framework of product liability,
related not only to nanotechnology, are concerned with how to assign
responsibility for damage, establish causal links, and define the scope of the
damage to be repaired.85

VI. LEGAL RESPONSE: PUBLIC AUTHORITY LIABILITY
Given the aforementioned problems, the constantly expanding scope of the
application of nanotechnology, and the increasing degree of risks, the discussion
on regulating liability for damage caused by nanoproducts is urgent. The
regulations presently in force for EU Members under the Product Liability
Directive fail to ensure appropriate levels of safety for users of nanoproducts. As
a result, users are deprived of full tort law protection, and in some cases of
damage caused by nanoproducts, they will not be able to obtain compensation. It
82
83
84
85

See Product Liability Directive, supra note 16 arts. 6(1)(c), 6(2).
See Product Liability Directive, supra note 16 art. 7(e).
See Product Liability Directive, ibid.
See also Machnikowski, supra note 67 at 699.

126 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[16 C.J.L.T.]

seems necessary to adjust tort law to these new challenges in order to ensure an
appropriate level of protection.
This section focuses on legal remedies that will facilitate the efforts of
nanotechnology’s users in obtaining compensation. The proposal goes beyond
the traditional concept of a product liability regime and concentrates not on
product liability itself, but on a public authority liability focused on the case of
the non-regulation, or improper regulation, of nanotechnology.

1. Justifying Regulation of Public Authority Liability
One may ask why policy-makers should be liable for taking any regulatory
action. The decision on whether or not to regulate a new technology depends
almost entirely on the vision of a particular policy-maker. Regulations are
supposed to reflect the societal interactions and needs, as well as attitudes,
existing in a society which usually expresses traditional, regional and cultural
diversity. Policy-makers have the freedom to make decisions concerning the
scope and form of regulations. This can help explain why GMO technology is
regulated differently in the US and the EU.86
One of the concerns around regulating for public authority liability with
respect to new technologies is the excessive burden this would place on public
authorities to foresee the effects of the legislative solutions that are adopted. 87
This leads to the more fundamental question of who should bear the risk of
regulatory policy, and why. First, it seems justifiable to assume that public
authorities should be aware of the consequences of their decisions. They have
access to a wide range of the latest research results, and if in doubt, they can
commission further analyses, evaluate regulatory proposals with experts and
public opinion, and, based on that, weigh the pros and cons. The policy-makers’
decision also has an impact on whether and how technology will be used by
companies, and how products will be introduced to the market. Companies thus
rely on legal regulation and adjust their production processes to the existing legal
framework. On the other hand, there is a threat that the users will bear all the
costs of introducing technology to the market.
It is clear that policy-makers are also the risk-taking actors when introducing
new technologies into public use. In the discussion on the role of government in
the innovation industry, one may find opinions such as the following, that:
Governments have always been lousy at picking winners, and they are
likely to become more so, as legions of entrepreneurs and tinkerers
swap designs online, turn them into products at home and market them
globally from a garage. As the revolution rages, governments should
86
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stick to the basics: better schools for a skilled workforce, clear rules and
a level playing field for enterprises of all kinds. Leave the rest to the
revolutionaries.88

To challenge this opinion Mariana Mazzucato puts a simple but relevant
question: who actually funded these revolutionaries?89 Taking as an example the
smartphone’s features such as internet connectivity, GPS, touchscreen, and
microchip, one must notice that they were all funded by governments,90 which
often make decisions on commercialization policy. Although the opinion that all
innovations flourish thanks to government action is exaggerated, one has to
notice that policy-makers can have a real impact on the technological reality.
While Mazzucato stops her arguments at proving why the government is an
active actor on the innovation field, thus explaining why companies should
contribute to public funds, it is possible to go a step further. The contribution of
public authorities to technological development can support the liability they
should bear for their policy decisions.
The next argument for regulating public authority liability is that it can
create incentives for policy-makers to take more effective and more
precautionary actions in order to ensure adequate levels of user protection.
Before making a legally binding decision on a regulatory policy, policy-makers
can, for example, commission more research on the potentially detrimental
effects of the technology to be regulated.
Liability for damages arising from the exercise of public authority can thus
influence the effective exercise of power. Although the functioning of the public
authority is not subject to basic economic assumptions, such as the assumption
of maximizing profits, public authority liability can create incentives for policymakers.91

2. Legal Basis for Regulation
Generally, to ensure an appropriate level of protection, there are other legal
concepts to be applied. However, none of them separately represent a sufficient
legal response to the challenges posed by nanotechnology.
One solution is to reconsider the existing legal framework of product liability
rules based on the Directive, so that it can fully cover all injuries caused by
nanotechnology. In other words, the regulation of product liability could be
tightened for producers. Among the shortcomings in establishing stricter
88
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regulation on product liability, the major one is the risk of hindering
technological development and innovation.92 Over-regulating product liability
rules can prevent companies from investing in further progress and research in
nanotechnology.93 It might be more profitable for the companies to use tested
and better-known techniques rather than applying innovations which could
expose them to the risk of paying high compensation. What is more, from an
economic perspective, the higher costs of production resulting from overly strict
legal requirements, or the more serious and real possibility of paying monetary
compensation, are often passed on to consumers. At the end of the day,
consumers would have to bear the costs of ensuring an adequate level of
protection.94
The other solution for balancing health and environmental risks against the
commercialization of nanotechnology, which was proposed in the literature,
concerns mandatory private-public insurance schemes.95 So far, private-public
insurance programs are typically applied to nuclear damage, where there is on
the one hand low-probability, but on the other, high-loss.96 According to
Maksim Rakhlin, private-public insurance could cover nanotechnology if the
elements were as follows: ‘‘(1) mandatory participation as a precondition to
research and development, (2) creation of a cross-insurer pool of premiums and
deductibles to use for claimant payouts, (3) federal government coverage of
losses exceeding coverage provided by a cross-insurer pool, and (4)
indemnification from tort liability of program participants.”97 In spite of the
fact that public-private insurance could possibly balance the risks posed by
nanotechnology applications and the need for commercialization of
nanomaterials and further technological development, this solution has certain
shortcomings. First, it does not create incentives for government to introduce
effective and well-balanced regulations. It also does not involve public
authorities in the innovation process. Second, it affects companies directly by
increasing the price of market participation.98 It means that smaller companies
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could be excluded from the market and at the same time consumers may bear the
additional costs.
Next, existing legal regulations around public authority liability are not an
adequate solution to tackle the problems related to nanotechnology. The liability
that the EU, as an entity with a legal personality, bears for damage caused by its
institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties, found in Article
340(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the EU99(TFEU), gives an illustrative
example.100 According to Article 4(2)(f) TFEU, consumer protection is one of the
areas where the EU and the Member States share their competencies, which
means that EU institutions can regulate nanotechnology from the perspective of
consumer protection.
In the first place, it should be noted that Article 340(2) TFEU does not
provide the specific prerequisites of liability, which are to be determined on the
basis of the general principles common to the Member States. The formulation of
the conditions of non-contractual liability lies with the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU), which is the only body that is competent to adjudicate
complaints for damages.101 There is uncertainty around this provision. Both the
general formulation of Article 340(2) TFEU and the diversification of liability
rules in the Member States result in the CJEU having wide discretion in setting
the rules for claiming damages. To some extent, this generality could be treated
as an advantage, as it creates flexibility. However, CJEU judgments in many
cases are inconsistent, often devoid of plausible justification, and the accepted
jurisprudence is often not continued in subsequent cases. As a consequence, the
liability of the EU is not predictable and cannot fully secure consumers’ rights
with respect to nanotechnology.
The CJEU formulates four conditions of liability for damages of the EU:
infringement of the rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals,
sufficiently serious breach, actual and certain damage, and direct causal link. 102
The lack of presumptions for any of the conditions hinders fulfilling and proving
all the requirements.
An interesting example with respect to the difficulties of proving causation is
the case, É.R.103 The applicants sought a remedy for damage allegedly suffered
by them as a consequence of the infection and subsequent death of members of
their families who developed a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (‘‘mad
98
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cow disease”). The applicants brought actions for damages against the EU for
allegedly unlawful conduct in failing to adopt appropriate measures to prevent
the risks presented by ‘‘mad cow disease”. The probable origin of the disease was
a change in the preparation of cattle feed, which contained proteins derived from
sheep infected with scrapie. Transmission of the disease came about mainly
through the ingestion of feed, in particular, meat-and-bone meal containing the
infectious agent that had not been eliminated.104 The applicants contended that
the European Council and European Commission persistently and deliberately
favoured the interests of traders on the market in beef and veal to the detriment
of the health of consumers when they assessed and managed the risks linked to
the disease. The applicants claimed that there were wrongful omissions on the
part of those institutions in carrying out their duties and obligations in the area
of animal and human health and that they adopted insufficient, incorrect,
inadequate or belated standards and measures to deal with the risks resulting
from ‘‘mad cow disease”.105 The Court concluded that the allegedly unlawful
actions and omissions of the Council and the Commission cannot be considered
to be a definite and direct cause of the infection. In the light of the circumstances
of the case, the Court stated that it had not been shown that if those institutions
had adopted, or had adopted earlier, the measures which the applicants criticized
them for not adopting, the damage in question would not have occurred. As a
result, the Court concluded that there was no causal link between the damage
pleaded and the allegedly unlawful conduct by the EU institutions. 106
The next problem is related to the limitation period. According to Article 46
of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union,107 proceedings
against the EU in matters arising from non-contractual liability shall be barred
after a period of five years from the occurrence of the event giving rise thereto.
The formula of limitation can drastically limit the possibility of claiming redress.
First, the beginning of the limitation period is counted from the materialization
of the damage, not from the moment of awareness of the damage. 108 Second,
there is no detailed regulation addressing postponement, which would facilitate a
significant extension of the running of the limitation period.109 Third, five years
seems to be relatively short when we take into account the long-lasting effects of
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nanotechnology. Therefore, the existing regulation on EU liability might not be a
sufficient legal response.

3. Regulation as the Best Form of Action?
As mentioned in Part IV, the non-legal regulatory mechanisms on their own,
which are the market, social norms and ‘‘architecture”, cannot guarantee a
sufficient level of protection with respect to the nanotechnology phenomenon.
The arguments discussed in Part IV remain relevant while analyzing the public
authority problem.
It should be noted that the liability for damage caused by acts or omissions
committed by a public authority is a common principle in European legal
systems.110 The lack of regulation or regulations providing an inaccurate
response to the risks created by nanotechnology results in law losing its function
as a regulatory mechanism for social relations. However, there are some
problems related to public authority liability. The uncertainty in determining the
proper standard of care is a challenge, and could cause liability to be blurred, or
create ineffective stimuli. Where liability is imposed excessively, a decreased level
of activity on the part of authorities could result. Conversely, if liability is
excessively tempered, an increase in the abuse of authority could result.
Secondly, liability will have an impact in terms of the costs of indemnification.
Public authorities paying compensation may also lead to a deterioration in state
budgets and increase the fiscal burden imposed on citizens. In order to avoid
these problems, non-legal mechanisms, such as an ‘‘innovation fund” will be
presented in Part VII.

4. The Appropriate Level(s) of Action
In the discussion on the appropriate level of regulating new technologies, the
main argument supporting the idea of unified, international regulations on
standards of protection is the transnational scope of the application of most new
technologies, the existence of international companies, and the world-wide
transfer of innovations.111 However, in the case of public authority liability, the
scope of regulation will be restricted to a defined political area. First, the
development of non-contractual liability is to a great degree different in
individual countries. Second, public authority liability will refer by nature to a
particular policy-maker. It means that the central point is to define the policymaker that has made a legally binding decision on nanotechnology. It could
make a significant difference when the same area of law can be regulated by
different bodies. For example, consumer protection is one of the areas where the
European Union and the Member States share their competencies.112
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5. Do the Benefits of Regulation Justify the Costs?
Undoubtedly, any regulation will create some costs. As noted above, in the
case of public authority liability these are mainly the costs of the compensatory
process. However, the proposed solution does not affect companies directly, so it
will probably not hinder technological development, which is always a serious
concern when regulating technologies. The government, on the other hand, will
not be left alone with the burden of the compensatory process if a general
‘‘innovation fund” is created. Companies will thus contribute to the
compensatory process and public authorities will not have look for additional
funding, for example, in the form of a tax increase. Owing to this regulation,
users will receive a mechanism to recover their losses, which means that they will
not bear all the costs of introducing technology to the market alone, and
therefore the benefits of regulation will justify the costs.

6. Transparency of the Distribution of Effects Across Society
One factor that policy-makers should take into account while drafting any
new regulation, is to assess the impact of the regulation on society, including
different social groups. This is a general and universal goal of regulatory
transparency. The riskier a technology is, the greater the effort policy-makers
should undertake to create transparent regulations related to public health and
the environment. On the one hand, transparency ensures that no groups will be
excluded from protection or be unjustifiably affected. On the other, it should
enable technology users a choice between the various possible technological
options.113 The necessity of transparency was also pointed out by the European
Commission in 2000,114 when the Commission stressed that the decision of
whether or not wait for more scientific data before taking steps towards
regulating emerging technology should be based on transparency. In December
2000, the European Parliament endorsed a resolution of the Commission on the
precautionary principle,115 where in point 14 the European Parliament agreed
with the Commission that, before any decision is taken on measures to be
adopted, the decision-maker should have an overview of the available knowledge
on the risks of the activity or substance, carried out by experts who are
independent of the interested parties, recognized by the international scientific
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community for their expertise in the field concerned, and appointed by means of
a transparent procedure.116
This proposal on public authority liability promotes the position of
consumers, taking into account that consumers are directly vulnerable to the
detrimental effect of using nanotechnology. Liability rules can thus ensure that
the users are not the only entities forced to bear the costs of technological
development.
However, it should be noted that regulatory decisions also affect companies,
businesses, and private research centers. The tougher regulations are, the more
precautionary measures and cost-benefit calculations companies have to
undertake to resolve convenient risk-optimizing behaviour, which in turn can
reduce incentives for investing in innovations.117 Stricter regulations could also
increase the costs of running a business. Policy-makers will usually justify the
decision of imposing more regulations on the ground that there is a fundamental
necessity to protect the environment and users of technology. The regulations,
however, need to be balanced and take into account the risks of using the
technology as well as its benefits. Decisions on how to balance regulatory steps
somewhere between an irrational fear of novelty and the potential harmful
effects of using nanotechnology should be based on the precautionary
principle.118 Literature and international acts use various definitions of the
precautionary principle.119 The UNESCO’s World Commission on the Ethics of
Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) tried to find a common core
from different wordings and definitions and proposed a general working
definition for the precautionary principle:
‘‘When human activities may lead to morally unacceptable harm that is
scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or
diminish that harm120 (. . .) [and] the judgement of plausibility should
be grounded in scientific analysis. Actions are interventions that are
undertaken before harm occurs that seek to avoid or diminish the
harm. Actions should be chosen that are proportional to the seriousness of the potential harm, with consideration of their positive and
negative consequences, and with an assessment of the moral implica-
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tions of both action and inaction. The choice of action should be the
result of a participatory process.”121

As Roberto Andoro points out, adequate regulatory steps are based on
common sense and practical observations of technological implications and
should be taken when there is enough empirical evidence and reliable hypotheses
that a new product or technology might be potentially dangerous for its users. 122
According to the European Commission, the lack of scientific proof of the
detrimental effects of using new technologies cannot be used to justify inaction.
All scientific advice and views should be taken into account, even if they
represent a minor fraction of the scientific community. 123
Without a balanced decision-making process, the most convenient and
easiest solution would be either a complete ban on nanoproducts production,
until all the risks are precisely determined, or the opposite scenario, not
regulating nanotechnology at all, because of a lack of sufficient knowledge.
Those solutions seem unrealistic, impractical, and would be contrary not only to
market rules but also to societal needs.
To protect companies and businesses from the threat of the overregulation of
new technology, it is important to consider the right of companies to claim for
compensation if the regulations are too tight. Although this solution is an afterthe-fact protection, it could probably create incentives for policy-makers to
introduce more balanced regulatory schemes and therefore companies will not be
excluded from protection.
Taking into account the existing legal framework in EU law, the major
problem with liability for legal actions concerns the prerequisite of unlawfulness.
In the context of liability for damage caused by overregulation, it might be
difficult to prove the unlawfulness of the legal acts. There was a lively and longlasting debate over the liability for lawful conduct. Initially, in the case Biovilac,
the Court of Justice stated that if the concept of liability without fault were
accepted in Community law (now European Union law), the action for damages
for lawful legislative action can succeed only if the damage alleged by the injured
party exceeds the limits of the economic risks inherent in operating in the sector
concerned.124 The liability for lawful acts referred to the German law concept of
“Sonderopfer” [special sacrifice] and the French law concept of “rupture de
l’égalité devant les charges publiques” [unequal discharge of public burdens]. 125
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However, in the FIAMM case,126 the Court of Justice rejected the concept of
liability for lawful acts. It based its decision on the argument that:
. . . comparative examination of the Member States’ legal systems
enabled the Court to make at a very early stage the finding concerning
convergence of those legal systems in the establishment of a principle of
liability in the case of unlawful action or an unlawful omission of the
authority, including of a legislative nature, that is in no way the
position as regards the possible existence of a principle of liability in the
case of a lawful act or omission of the public authorities, in particular
where it is of a legislative nature”.127

The Court of Justice also stressed that the legislative context is characterized
by the exercise of wide discretion, which is essential for implementing
Community policy. Therefore, the Community cannot incur liability unless the
institution concerned has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on the
exercise of its powers.128 It means that the wide scope of legislative freedom is
crucial for the making of EU policy decisions and thus the existing legal rules
would probably not cover the case of the overregulation of nanotechnology if
injured companies are limited to compensation only in the case of unlawfulness.
Although the Court of Justice rejects liability for lawful acts, there are certain
arguments in favour of this solution. Such regulation will provide the aggrieved
parties with compensatory damages suffered in connection with the use of
nanotechnology, when it is not possible to obtain compensation directly from a
producer (e.g. due to the limitation period or to legal requirements by a
producer, etc.) and thus strengthen protections for users. On the other hand,
companies will have the opportunity to obtain compensatory damages in the case
of overregulation. In this way, a balance between all stakeholders will be
maintained, and users and companies will have an indirect impact on actions
taken by policy-makers.

7.

Keeping the Regulations Clear, Consistent, Comprehensible, and
Accessible to Users

It seems that the more complex and complicated technology becomes, the
more the rules of liability should be simple and straightforward.129 In the case of
nanotechnology, highly specialized and detailed knowledge is necessary to
understand all the complex processes that are involved. What makes
126
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nanotechnology even more complicated is its interdisciplinary approach, which
necessitates cooperation between experts in biology, physics and chemistry. The
complexity of this issue also has an impact on regulations. It seems that certain
regulations remain specific and scientific (e.g. rules directed to researchers or
producers on the minimum/maximum quantities of nanomaterials in a product).
However, the regulations which are addressed to an ‘‘ordinary” user as well as
the general liability principles should be kept simple. One of the ideas for making
this a reality is to establish principle-based regulation, which can be adjusted to
changing and more complex technological problems.130 Undoubtedly, such a
regulation would ensure flexibility, which means that the legal act does not have
to be changed that often. On the other hand, it could not guarantee the stability
of the law. Moreover, simple and straightforward regulation requires more
initiative from the authorities which apply the law, including courts and
regulatory bodies.

8. Presenting Views by Stakeholders
Recent research shows that the public expects the government to take
regulatory steps in the area of nanotechnology,131 which means that the voice of
the users of nanotechnology is important in the debate on nanotechnology. At
the same time, the companies using nanomaterials might be interested in
imposing public authority liability, as legal regulatory acts influence business
decisions including the necessity of adjusting production processes in line with
established requirements.132 Before introducing new regulation, policy-makers
should take into account the views of all stakeholders, for example, through
public debates, or by hearing from groups of experts working on
nanotechnology. Any legislative initiative, which is not preceded by reliable
public and expert debate, might be socially destructive. The role of policy makers
is to initiate discussions, which should be held at the national as well as the
essential local level. At the national level, policy-makers could lead an
information campaign through traditional and social media, or hold public
consultations through government online platforms. Examples of such actions
might include public consultations organized by the European Commission and
certain agencies of the European Union such as the European Food Safety
Authority. These consultations concern policy approaches that can ease the
development of emerging technologies such as the Internet of Things, 133 as well
as nanotechnology.134 The results of consultations can be analyzed and discussed
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by a group of independent experts from different research centers. Policy-makers
can also commission additional reports on the effects of imposing public
authority liability on state budgets.
However, in practice public consultations have their limits. The most
significant problem is that information about public consultations reaches only a
limited number of people. For example, in public consultations on the Internet of
Things, organized by the European Commission in 2012, only 600 people
responded.135 It seems that the circulation of information is insufficient. Perhaps
more effective actions can be performed at the local level by local authorities. For
example, they could manage information campaigns in schools or public debates
at universities. They could prepare and spread brochures, and invite citizens to
take part in various surveys. Information could also be included in local
newspapers or posters. At the local level, important tasks are undertaken by nongovernmental organizations, which are independent of government but can
cooperate with local authorities.

VII. ACHIEVING COMPLIANCE — DRAFTING REGULATIONS
According to Van Dam, ‘‘in establishing liability of public authorities, courts
have to steer between not hampering a good government on the one hand, and
correcting bad government on the other”.136 In EU law, public authority liability
is regulated in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union and by the
decisions of the CJEU.
Public authority liability in the case of nanotechnology would remain a part
of the tort law system. One may, however, pose the question as to whether public
authority liability should cover only nanotechnology and exclude other emerging
technologies. While it is true that nanotechnology is used widely in everyday
products and its long-term consequences are still unknown, it has to be noted
that many other products pose considerable challenges for regulatory decisions
due to their high risk for users’ safety (e.g. asbestos, mercury). Just as the sphere
of unknown technological processes is growing, there will probably be more and
more examples of technologies, such as genetic engineering, causing similar
problems. Excluding other technologies from the scope of legal regulations on
public authority liability thus seems unjustified and impractical.
The potential elements and features of the proposed regulation shall be as
follows. Public authority liability should be a subsidiary claim to the one against
the producer of nanoproducts. If the infringed party does not receive
compensation from the company (e.g. when the company followed legal
requirements while monitoring production processes), then s/he could make a
claim for compensation from the public authority. If the infringed party received
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compensation from the company, s/he will not have a right to sue the public
authority. The claim against the public authorities, however, could be a recourse
claim, meaning if the company provided the compensation and the injury is the
result of inadequate regulatory measures, the company could make a claim in
restitution for the public authority to return the previously paid compensation.
Furthermore, with regard to nanotechnology, subjectively understood fault
should be replaced with objective criteria such as the infringement of the legal
rules and/or precautionary principles, and move from fault-based liability to
strict liability. In extreme cases, when the damage is unpredictable and has
enormous scope, compensation should be granted even if the actions of public
authorities were lawful.
The next element is that of causal link. As shown in the É.T. case, proof of a
direct causal link can be a serious obstacle when seeking compensation.
Furthermore, European law contains a general principle that the party which
makes a claim bears the burden of proof regarding that claim. This is also
applicable to a defence.137 In the case of nanotechnology, the injured party
usually does not have a real possibility of gathering all the detailed information
on the causal link or exact source of damage. Creating presumptions or changing
the burden of proof will mitigate the barriers posed by the current process of
proving causality. This would mean that the policy-maker will have to prove that
it has not infringed precautionary principles. With this change in the burden of
proof, the injured party will receive a real chance of obtaining compensation.
Taking into account the fact that the long-term consequences of
nanotechnology are mostly unknown, the limitation period plays an important
role in regulating public authority liability. The length of the limitation period in
the case of the EU liability is now five years from the moment of the event giving
rise to liability. The Court of Justice’s case-law indicates that the length of that
period has been determined from the perspective of the necessary amount of time
that the aggrieved party needs in order to collect the relevant information in
order to submit a claim, and to review the facts that are to be invoked in support
of that claim.138
This argument does not correspond with the nature and problems related to
nanotechnology. Unknown long-term consequences justify the proposal of
starting the limitation period from the time of an injured party’s knowledge
about the cause of the damage. The five-year limitation period itself seems
adequate as the scope of protection of the aggrieved party’s interests depends not
only on the length of the limitation period, but also on the manner in which its
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inception is determined (e.g. the moment of occurrence of damage, the moment
of knowledge about the damage, the moment of knowledge about the source of
damage) and the possibilities for its interruption and/or suspension (e.g. the
impact of force majeure, the mediation, etc.).
It should be noted that the objective of the limitation period is, on the one
hand, to ensure protection for the rights of the aggrieved party and to give that
party sufficient time to file a claim, while on the other hand, to prevent a
situation in which the aggrieved party could endlessly delay pursuing their right
to compensation. The limitation period is intended to encourage the aggrieved
party to take action, and after its expiry, to stabilize the legal situation. 139 The
primary objective of the limitation period concept is the more general protection
of the interests of the tortfeasor.
In conjunction with the fact that claims for damages against a public
authority can involve a financial burden on the public authority and thus the
state, the limitation period in the case of public authority liability is directly
associated with the necessity of solicitude about public finances. 140 The
limitation period thus allows the state to protect its finances from the demands
of individuals who have not displayed the necessary diligence and failed to take
advantage of their rights in the time provided.141 The five-year limitation period,
counting from the time of knowledge about the source of damage seems an
appropriate balance.
To achieve an effective protection system, there are certain mechanisms that
should accompany hard law regulations. To avoid the situation in which the cost
of indemnification procedures will be incurred by citizens, it is necessary to create
a mechanism, which will separate payment of compensation by public authorities
from the state budget. A solution to this problem is the creation of a special
‘‘innovation fund”. The essence of such a fund would be to create a general
return mechanism and promote cooperation between public authorities and
private companies. The primary assumption of the innovation fund is that
companies using nanotechnology will share their profits with the government. It
could be, for instance, 0.05% of annual income or one pre-determined
contribution per five-year period. The innovation fund could serve a dual
function. First, public authorities can use it as a special fund to pay potential
compensation. If the public authority is found liable for taking inadequate
regulatory steps, injured parties will have a guarantee that there is a source to pay
compensation. At the same time, the payment of the compensation will be not
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imposed on all citizens, which would be the case if the public authority had to
pay it from public funds (and public funds are based on taxation). Moreover, the
private sector’s contribution to the innovation fund will burden private
companies to a lesser degree than if the compensation was paid directly by
companies, mainly because it will only consist of a small part of the company’s
profits. Nevertheless, such a contribution does, to a certain extent, transfer the
financial burden to the private sector. This scheme should be considered
appropriate, as the companies are those parties which make the most profits.
The aim of the innovation fund is not only compensatory. The second
function performed by this fund would be the contribution to further
technological development, first by subsidizing further research and also by
ordering additional research. This role of the innovation fund distinguishes it
from an insurance scheme.
The financing of research and development (R&D) is of particular interest to
many modern policy-makers. A general objective of the EU, adopted in the 2010
under the Europe 2020 Strategy,142 is to increase total expenses on R&D to the
level of 3% of GDP.143 Statistics presented by the World Bank in 2015 show that
the percentage of GDP devoted to R&D looks as follows: World 2.23%, OECD
2.55%, USA 2.79%, and European Union 2.05%. The data also presents
important differences between EU Member States, e.g. Sweden 3.26%, Denmark
3.01%, and Finland 2.90%, as compared to Greece 0.96%, Latvia 0.63%, and
Romania 0.49%.144 In 2017, the OECD published a new edition of Research and
Development Statistics (RDS), which covers recent data on R&D in all OECD
countries and selected non-member states.145
It suggests that two-thirds of the expenditures on R&D should come from
the private sector.146 To encourage companies to spend more on stimulating
innovations, public authorities offer R&D subsidies to companies. 147 However,
the impact of R&D subsidies on increasing expenditures in the private sector and
thus on fostering the innovation process is under discussion. 148 There is also
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uncertainty as to whether such subsidies help to improve an internal technology
strategy in a company and what their impact is in the long-term on a company’s
development.149 Some research shows that while subsidies on research (activities
‘‘far from the market”) result in a larger budget on research activities, subsidies
on development (activities ‘‘close to the market”) decrease the expenditures for
development activities.150 Therefore, direct subsidies are not a fully adequate
mechanism for supporting R&D.
The other possibility for supporting further innovation lies in various
programmes financed from public funds, which are managed by research funding
agencies, either national or international. At the EU level, a grant system is
administered by the European Research Council (ERC). Funding awarded by
the ERC is based on open competition and is not limited to certain disciplines. 151
The funding scheme is now, however, mainly dependent on Horizon 2020, the
European Union’s Research Framework Programme for 2014 to 2020.152 It
means that the grant system is limited to the framework adopted under this
programme. Furthermore, a seven-year period might be in some cases too long
for the same grant scheme. The scope and intensity of technological development
are evolving and growing faster than policy-makers can react.
Therefore, an innovation fund could provide a more efficient, flexible and
adequate response to the needs and requests of the private sector. Companies
and research centers should have the possibility of receiving funds on a regular
basis, not only within special programs or frameworks. The application for
funding should be based on a peer-review grant system, and the application,
including detailed objectives and research steps, should be assessed by an
independent and diversified commission composed of experts in a specific field.
Perhaps double-blind reviews would be sufficient to reach an objective decision.
Due to the two functions of the innovation fund, it should be organized by a
government agency and supervised by a relevant ministry (at the EU level, by an
EU agency and the European Commission respectively). The scope of
application should not be limited and should include both basic and applied
research, as well as development activities.
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Funds collected by the public authority should remain non-refundable,
which means that after the limitation period they would not be returned to the
companies.
At the same time, the users of nanoproducts should be informed of the
nanomaterials used in products as well as of the risks related to nanotechnology.
Labelling, educational programs at schools, financed for example by the
innovation fund, and the contribution of the media, would be beneficial for
users, companies and public authorities. Users could then make a more informed
decision about whether they want to expose themselves to the possible risks. 153
Along with educational programs, public authorities should perform a duty of
monitoring regulation on nanotechnology by creating constant commissions and
mandatory periodic reviews of existing legal rules (e.g. every three-five years). 154

VIII. CONCLUSION
Nanotechnology undoubtedly poses new regulatory challenges. Although it
has certain known benefits, it poses considerable risks to its users, with unknown
and unpredictable long-term consequences. While looking for solutions to ensure
the adequate level of protection and to enable users the possibility of seeking
redress for damages caused by nanotechnology, I have examined the existing
legal framework for product liability in the EU. The notion of product
defectiveness, the shape of the development risk defence, and the limitation
period indicate that the application of the Product Liability Directive to
nanotechnology might be limited. In order to provide users with an adequate tort
law mechanism, I propose regulating a public authority liability for legislative
omissions. Policy-makers should take an active part in the compensatory process
since if and how technology will be used by companies usually depends on
governmental decisions. Users, on the other hand, should not bear all the costs of
introducing technology to the market. This proposal argues that public authority
liability should be a subsidiary claim to a claim against the producers of
nanoproducts, and be based on objective criteria. The burden of proof should be
changed in such a way that policy-makers will have to prove that they have not
infringed precautionary principles as they apply in regulating nanotechnology.
Further, the limitation period should run from the time of knowledge about the
cause of damage. There is also a need to introduce certain mechanisms
accompanying hard law regulation such as a special ‘‘innovation fund”, labelling,
educational programs on nanotechnology, as well as mandatory periodic reviews
of existing legal rules by government commissions.

153
154

Compare BRE & NCC, ‘‘Too Much Information”, supra note 79.
See also Marchant, Sylvester & Abbott, ‘‘Nano Oversight” supra note 50 at 727.

